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INVESTIGATION OF THE CROSS-SHIP COMPARISON
 
"
 MONITORING METHOD OF FAILURE DETECTION
 
IN THE HiMAT RPRV
 
James A. Wolf
 
INTRODUCTION
 
The highly maneuverable aircraft technology (HiMAT)
 
program will provide researchers in the military, industry,
 
and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
 
a developmental tool with which to test new concepts for the
 
next generation fighter aircraft. The HiMAT remotely piloted
 
research vehicle (RPRV) is a subscale prototype which will
 
have enhanced maneuverability (sustained 8G turn, 0.9 M, at
 
7,900 m) using state-of-the-art technology (ref. 1).
 
The HiMAT RPRV has a basic design requirement that no
 
single failure shall result in the loss of the vehicle (ref.
 
2). The method by which this requirement is met, with re­
spect to failure detection in the canard, aileron, and eleva­
tor servosystems, is of some concern. The on-board primary
 
microcomputer compares the surface position of corresponding
 
right and left surfaces. This cross-ship comparison monitor­
ing (CSCM) should detect a servosystem failure in time for
 
a safe recovery. However, a failure indication for any other
 
reason other than a failed servosystem (nuisance trip) would
 
greatly hamper the research mission. By using a computer
 
model of the HiMAT CSCM technique, the sensitivity to servo­
system differences was evaluated. It is important that the
 
CSCM be evaluated to improve confidence in the performance
 
and to define potential problems. This report gives a brief
 
background of the HiMAT RPRV, describes the modeling of the
 
servosystems and failure detection scheme, and discusses the
 
possible effects of variations between servosystems.
 
SYMBOLS 
ACT actuator 
A/D analog-to-digital converter 
AGE auxiliary ground equipment 
AMP command amplifier 
C hydraulic control pressure, psi 
CMDS commands 
COMP computer 
CSCM cross-ship comparison monitoring 
cm centimeters 
DEMOD demodulator 
DISCR discrete 
dB decibel 
deg degree 
EHSV electrohydraulic servovalve 
FB feedback amplifier 
FDBKS feedbacks 
F.S. full stroke 
f frequency, Hz 
G acceleration of gravity, m/sec
2 
GA actuator 
gain, in 
G4 command gain, mA/Vdc 
2 
G5 ram LVDT gain Vac/in 
G6 ram demodulator gain, Vdc/Vac 
G7 feedback gain, mA/Vdc 
G11 linkage gain, deg/in 
GV servovalve gain, in3/sec-mA 
HiMAT highly maneuverable airc'raft 
technology 
Hz hertz 
IL current limit, mA 
I/O input-output 
IPCS integrated propulsion control system 
IT current threshold, mA 
k kth iteration 
LOOP 1 first servosystem model 
LOOP 2 second servosystem model 
LT left 
LVDT linear variable-differential-transformer 
M Mach number 
m meter 
mA millampere 
ms millisecond 
N noise source 
n number of bits 
P 1 hydraulic source pressure, psi 
POS position 
PROP propulsion 
*1 hydraulic return pressure, psi 
RL rate limit, in/sec 
3 
RPRV remotely piloted research vehicle
 
RPV remotely piloted vehicle
 
Rs sample rate, samples/sec
 
RT right
 
SOL solenoid
 
s Laplace variable 
sps samples/sec 
T iteration period 
t time, sec 
tt transfer time delay 
Vac volts, ac 
Vc command voltage 
Vdc volts, dc 
VDL left demodulator output signal 
VDR right demodulator output signal
 
Vm demodulator monitor signal
 
V0 dc component of demodulator output
 
VR amplitude of demodulator ripple signal
 
XL ram stroke limit, in
 
6s surface deflection, deg
 
Oerror rate, deg/sec
 
c commanded surface rate, deg/sec
 
6d transfer delay error, deg
 
Of failed surface rate, deg/sec
 
0fs full stroke deflection range, deg
 
q quantization error, deg
 
initiation point of lock-up, deg
 
4
 
os safe limit 
Ost sample rate error, deg 
6t computer threshold limit 
Subscripts: 
i input 
0 output 
k-i previous iteration 
5
 
HiMAT RPRV
 
A brief description of the HiMAT RPRV is given in the
 
first section. The focus of the following sections is on the
 
method of failure detection for the simplex servosystems which
 
actuate the canard, aileron, and elevator control surfaces.
 
Pertinent background information is given and some of the pot­
ential problems discussed.
 
Description
 
The HiMAT RPRV is a scaled version (.44) of an advanced
 
technology fighter aircraft. There are numerous state-of­
the-art concepts implemented in the design, such as the com­
posite structure, close-coupled canards, and wingtip fins.
 
Figure 1 illustrates the dimensions of the vehicle and the
 
five types of control surfaces. The following subsections
 
give an overview of the HiMAT RPRV and program, and because
 
the subject of this report is the failure detection in the
 
simplex servosystems, these systems are discussed in depth.
 
Overview. - In the primary flight mode the vehicle is
 
controlled by the ground-based pilot in the cockpit of the
 
Remotely Piloted Vehicle (RPV) facility (see figure 2). This
 
facility provides the pilot with conventional displays using
 
downlinked data from the HiMAT RPRV. Pilot commands are pro­
cessed in the ground-based computer, then uplinked to the on­
board microcomputer which outputs the command signals to the
 
respective control surface actuators.
 
There are two on-board microcomputers in operation during
 
the primary flight mode. This is the normal mode for maneuver
 
and cruise research. The major functions are distributed be­
, 6
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Figure 1.- Three-view drawing of HiMAT RPRV. Dimensions are in meters-.
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Figure 2.- Conceptual layout of RPRV operation with ground facility.
 
tween the two computers. One computer is termed the primary
 
computer and one is termed the back-up computer. Although
 
the back-up computer has a major function in the primary flight
 
mode, the term "back-up" arises because, should a failure oc­
cur, there would be a transfer of some functions from the pri­
mary computer to the back-up computer. Functions that are not
 
taken over by the back-up computer are halted. Table 1 shows
 
the division of tasks between computers. Figure 3 is a block
 
diagram of the on-board computer system (ref. 1).
 
If a function or element has an importance'to the RPRV
 
such that its failure would result in loss of the vehicle, it
 
is defined to be a flight critical function or element. Flight
 
critical functions or elements are dual redundant (i.e., on­
board microcomputers, electrical power system, and rudder and
 
elevon hydraulic systems).
 
Mission critical functions or elements are not essential
 
to keeping the vehicle in flight (i.e., canards, ailerons, and
 
elevators). However, a failure of one of these functions or
 
elements, would constitute an immediate end to the research
 
mission and a return to base. Effective failure detection of
 
the mission critical functions or elements should prevent loss
 
of the vehicle. As an example, take the case of a failure in
 
a canard servosystem, the failure detection routine would:
 
1. Detect the failure
 
2. Begin the actuator locking sequence
 
3. Transfer control to the back-up computer
 
The backup system would provide emergency return home
 
capability using an on-board autopilot. The flight critical
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PRIMARY COMPUTER BACK-UP COMPUTER
 
MODE PROCESSING TASKS PROCESSING TASKS
 
- primary flight sensor data - integrated propulsion
 
Primary - control surfaces control system
 
Flight - uplink information
 
Mode - downlink information
 
- failure detection
 
Back-up 
Flight 
- back-up control surfaces 
Mode 
- back-up autopilot 
- reduced IPCS 
- sensor data 
TABLE 1
 
MAJOR FUNCTIONS OF THE PRIMARY
 
AND BACK-UP COMPUTERS IN THE PRIMARY AND BACK-UP CONTROL MODES
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Figure 3.- Functional block diagram of the on-board computer system.
 
control surfaces (elevons and rudders) would be used to con­
trol the HiMAT RPRV back to a lakebed landing. The pilot can
 
control the altitude variations, directions, and speed using
 
discrete commands. The canards, ailerons, and elevators are
 
hydraulically locked at a predetermined position.
 
Simplex servosystems. - The ten control surfaces of the
 
HiMAT RPRV are positioned using hydraulic servoactuators. The
 
mission critical surfaces (canards, ailerons, and elevators)
 
have a single hydraulic supply and input. This is defined to
 
be a simplex servosystem. Except for the elevator, which has
 
a higher force output requirement (tandem actuator), they have
 
a single actuator. This is shown in figure 4 which is a sche­
matic of the simplex servoactuator. The control surface char­
acteristics are shown in table 2. Notice that the canards
 
can move symmetrically or antisymmetrically, but not combined.
 
Uplinked pilot commands are converted from a digital sig­
nal to an analog signal and fed to the commanded surfaces.
 
The simplex servosystem is illustrated in figure 5 with a
 
block diagram (ref. 3). Table 3 gives the corresponding gain
 
values. The servoamplifier sums the command and feedback in­
puts and supplies a proportional output current to the electro­
hydraulic servovalve (EHSV). The EHSV controls the fluid flow
 
rate to the actuator (ref. 4). The actuator provides the
 
force output to move the control surface to the commanded
 
position. The surface deflection rate is determined by the
 
characteristics of the EHSV and actuator. Position feedback
 
is derived from the output of the linear variable-differential
 
transformer (LVDT) (ref. 5). The iron core of the transformer
 
is attached to the actuator ram (see figure 4). The LVDT pri­
12
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AILERONS 

Servo- single input 

Actuator single actuator 

type
 
Surface antisymmetric 

deflection 

Maximum 90 /sec 

surface
 
rate
 
Location on outboard 

the vehicle wing 

surface 

CANARDS ELEVATORS
 
single input single input
 
single actuator tandem actuator
 
antisymmetric symmetric
 
or
 
symmetric
 
90°/sec 90°/sec
 
forward inboard
 
control wing
 
surface surface
 
TABLE 2
 
CONTROL SURFACE CHARACTERISTICS
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Figure 5.- Block diagram of the simplex servosystem and failure detection scheme.
 
Symbol Canard Aileron Elevator Units 
Gv 0.636 0.636 1.503 in
3/sec-mA 
GA 0.909 0.909 0.455 in 
- 2 
G 4 6.969 6.969 8.621 mA/VDC 
G 5 2.919 2.919 2.919 VAC/in 
G6 3.824 3.824 3.824 VDc/VAc 
G 7 12.346 12.346 10.471 mA/VDc 
Gil 39.72 39.72 34.13 Deg/in 
IL +4.0 +4.0 +4.0 mA 
+0.870 
XL +0.503 +0.503 -0.595 in 
RL 2.312 2.312 2.733 in/sec 
VC +10 +10 +10 VDC 
+30 
6s +20 +20 -20 Deg 
Vm +5.60 +5.60 +8.176 VDC 
GV - EHSV Gain G11 - Linkage Gain 
GA - Actuator Gain IL - Command Current Limit 
- Command Gain XL - Ram Stroke Limit 
G5 
G6 
- Ram LVDT Gain 
- Ram Demond Gain 
RL 
Vc 
- Ram Rate Limit 
- Actuator Command G2 
= G 
G7 - Feedback Gain ss - Surface-Position ass. -TED 
Vm - Ram LVDT Monitor --­*TEU 
TABLE 3
 
SIMPLEX SERVOSYSTEM GAINS AND SPECIFICATIONS
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mary winding is excited by an oscillator as the actuator
 
ram changes position (causing an accompanying change in the
 
surface deflection). The iron core movement causes a change
 
in the amplitude of the induced voltage in the secondary wind­
ings. This signal is demodulated and fed back to the servo­
amplifier. The demodulated signal is also picked off-and con­
verted to a digital signal for use in the CSCM failure detec­
tion scheme. Command signals sent from the primary micro­
computer and monitoring of the LVDT output occur at a rate of
 
53.33 hertz (18.75 millisecond cycle time). The command in­
put will be a series of steps. The output of the LVDT demod­
ulator will also appear to the computer as a series of steps,
 
due to the sampling effect.
 
The simplex servosystem frequency response should be
 
flat out to about 13 hertz under no-load conditions for move­
ments up to thirty percent of full actuator ram stroke. The
 
load frequency response specifications for displacements of up
 
to ten percent full-stroke and thirty percent of maximum rate
 
are listed below (ref. 3)
 
Attenuation - Less than +2 or -3 dB out to 3 hertz
 
Phase Shift - Less than 30 degrees out to 3 hertz
 
The servosystems will be operating under loaded condi­
tions a majority of the time. The potential for a problem in
 
the CSCM exists during flight due to aerodynamic loading of
 
the control surfaces. This is because there are conditions
 
in the flight envelope where the loading on one surface may
 
be different from the loading on the opposite surface. This
 
would mean a difference in response characteristics and thus,
 
a chance for an error between corresponding surface position
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indications. The failure detection system design must take
 
this into account.
 
Failure Detection
 
The following subsections describe the design approach
 
for the CSCM failure detection scheme. A general description
 
of how it works, design constraints, and possible sources.of
 
error are given.
 
Design approach. - With the requirement that a single
 
failure shall not result in loss of the vehicle, flight crit­
ical elements or functions must have a failure detection tech­
nique and back-up system. Mission critical elements or func­
tions must have a failure detection technique that not only
 
detects the failure but provides a return to stable flight
 
(ref. 2). This is why the canards, elevators and ailerons
 
are designed to move to a locked position after a first fail­
ure.
 
The failure detection and corrective action must be de­
signed to respond quickly because of the fast response of the
 
actuators and the vehicle. The actuators can move the con­
trol surfaces at a maximum rate of 90 degrees per second.
 
Likewise, a failed servosystem could move the control surface
 
at the maximum rate. It is possible, however, that a control
 
surface could fail at the maximum rate while the surfaces are
 
responding to a command signal. The resulting error rate be­
tween corresponding surface positions would exceed 90 degrees
 
per second.
 
Functional description of the cross-ship comparison mon­
itoring. - The failure detection method for the canards, ail­
erons, and elevators uses the fact that these surfaces move
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either symmetrically or antisymmetrically. A comparison is
 
made between respective right and left surface deflections.
 
The on-board microcomputer monitors the comparison to deter­
mine the integrity of the aileron, canard, and elevator con­
trol surfaces.
 
The dc voltage output, from the actuator ram LVDT demod­
ulator, proportional to the control surface position,is con­
verted to a digital value (ref. 6). The microcomputer sums
 
the values of each side, as in the case of the ailerons, to
 
determine an error value. Because the canards move either
 
antisymmetrically or symmetrically, depending on which mode
 
they are in, the difference or sum of the surface positions is
 
used. The error value is compared to the predetermined thres­
hold value stored as a constant in the computer. Should the
 
error value exceed the computer limit, a failure would be de­
clared and an immediate switch to the back-up mode initiated.
 
The on-board microprocessor samples and processes the
 
surface position information of the ailerons, elevators, and
 
canards 53.33 times a second. The LVDT demodulator output
 
voltage is converted to a 12 bit digital word. Since the de­
modulator voltage range is plus or minus 5.62 volts and the
 
A/D converter is a plus or minus 10 volt type, the full A/D
 
converter is not used (ref. 4).
 
A digital word representing a control surface position on
 
one side is updated by the computer. Twenty-five microseconds
 
later the opposite side is updated. This is done just prior
 
to the output of a command signal so that any servosystem
 
transients from the previous cycle will have died down. The
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two double precision words 	representing corresponding surfaces
 
are added or subtracted. The resulting quantity represents
 
the error value between surfaces. The most significant eight
 
bits are compared to the threshold constant stored in the com­
puter. If the error value 	exceeds the threshold value, the
 
resulting switch to back-up is initiated and the control sur­
face lock-up sequence begins. The lock-up sequence and res­
pective time delays are as 	follows:
 
1. Switch relay to de-energize solenoid - 15ms 
2. 	 De-energize locking solenoid - 20 ms
 
3. 	 Hydraulic lag before check valves seat and ram
 
begins to move to the lock-up position - 15ms
 
Thus, the total transfer delay before a failed actuator be­
gins moving to the lock-up position is 50 milliseconds. For
 
the case where one surface is fixed and the other is failing
 
at the maximum rate of 90 degrees per second, the total trans­
fer delay translates into an error between surfaces of 4.5
 
degrees. Therefore, the threshold value should be selected
 
such that an additional error of 4.5 degrees would not ex­
ceed the safe limit.
 
Design Constraints on the cross-ship comparison monitor­
ing technique. - The error between ailerons, canards, or ele­
vators allowed before an unrecoverable flight condition occurs
 
is seven degrees, ten degrees, and seven degrees, respectively.
 
These values were determined based on simulation studies and
 
on analysis of the effects for the case of one control surface
 
fixed and the other failing hardover (90 degrees per second).
 
However, it is possible for a failure to occur during posi­
tioning of the surfaces. This could result in an error rate
 
of 	greater than 90 degrees per second.
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There is a design compromise between the allowance of
 
false failure indications, and the risk of losing the vehicle
 
in the event a failure goes undetected. False failure indica­
tions, termed "nuisance trips", are very detrimental to the
 
research mission because of considerable overhead involved in
 
a single mission and the delays involved in troubleshooting
 
the cause of the nuisance trip. Determination of a computer
 
threshold value involves design trade-offs.
 
Two cases will be considered and the computer threshold
 
values that are appropriate determined. The first case as­
sumes the good control surface is fixed at some position when
 
the opposite surface fails. The maximum error allowed before
 
initiation of the lock-up sequence (e ) is the difference be­
tween the safe limit allowance (as) and the error accumulated
 
due to the total transfer delay (0d).
 
@d = tt x e 
at = adas -

To assure that the lock-up sequence begins some time before
 
the error reaches 6k, the worst case should be assumed. This
 
means that the quantization error due to the analog-to-digital
 
conversion is at the maximum and the sampling instant is the
 
one least desirable. The quantization error is equal to the
 
amount of control surface deflection represented by the least
 
significant bit. For the CSCM technique, the comparison error
 
value is represented by an eight bit digital word. The quan­
tization error in degrees is therefore,
 
oq = ofs /2n
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where, efs = full surface deflection range 
n = number of bits used in the comparison 
to the threshold value 
The least desirable sampling instant is at a point immediately
 
before the error value reaches the computer threshold limit.
 
The computer will not detect a failure until the next sample
 
period. Therefore, the error accumulation in one sample per­
iod (1/Rs where Rs is the sample rate) at the specified error
 
rate (0) is
 
6
sr = 6/Rs
 
Thus, the computer threshold limit (at ) together with the
 
quantization (0q) and sample rate error (Ssr) should be less
 
than the maximum error allowed before initiation of the lock­
up sequence (6) or:
 
8 0

= , - esr - q
t 

Figure 6 illustrates the error rate between surfaces, the
 
worst-case quantization and sample rate error, and the re­
quired threshold limit.
 
The second case is that in which the good control surface
 
is not fixed, but moving in such a way so as to produce a
 
greater error rate than 90 degrees per second. The error rate
 
(6) is now equal to the sum of the failed surface rate (Of)
 
and the commanded surface rate (0c),
 
a = Of = ec
 
The computer threshold limit is calculated as described in the
 
first case. Table 4 gives the computer threshold limit values
 
for the canards, ailerons, and elevators for the 90 degrees
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Fiaure 6.- Determination of the comouter threshold limit. 
CANARDS ELEVATORS AILERONS 
ERROR RATE 
(DEGREES/SEC) 90 95 90 95 90 95 
a 
INITIATION 
POINT OF 5.5 5.25 2.5 2.25 2.5 2.25 
LOCK-UP 
TRANSFER 
DELAY ERROR 4.50 4.75 4.50 4.75 4.50 4.75 
(DEGREES) 
8d 
SAMPLEERROR RATE 
(DEGREES) 1.69 1.78 1.69 1.78 1.69 1.78 
sr 
QUANTIZAT IONERROR (DEGREES) 
.16 .16 .20 .20 .16 .16 
aq 
SAFE LIMIT 
(DEGREES) 10 10 7 7 7 7 
a8s 
COMPUTER 
THRESHOLD 3.65 3.31 0.69 0.35 0.65 0.31 
LIMIT 
(DEGREES) 
at 
TABLE 4
 
SUMMARY OF PARAMETERS USED IN
 
DETERMINING COMPUTER THRESHOLD LIMITS
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per second error rate case and for a 95 degrees per second
 
error rate, illustrating the second case. It is evident that
 
the calculated computer threshold limit for the elevators and
 
ailerons is cause for. concern. The total transfer delay ac­
counts for a considerable amount of error. A reduction in
 
this delay would allow the computer threshold limit to be in­
creased. This might be accomplished by using a different
 
switching relay to de-energize the locking solenoid. A re­
duction in the 20 millisecond de-energizing time to 4 milli­
seconds may be possible with a resulting increase in the nec­
essary computer threshold limit (et) of 1.44 degrees. The
 
availablity of the faster switching relay is not likely to be
 
a problem.
 
The sample rate error (Osr) is fixed because of con­
straints on the on-board computer loading. Since the compu­
tati6nal load is near the maximum, any additional increase
 
in sampling is not feasible. The quantization error (eq)
 
could be reduced if the full range of the analog-to-digital
 
converter were used and the full 12 bits instead of the most
 
significant 8 bits were used. This would increase the
 
computational loading to some degree, however, and the
 
elimination of this error may not justify the additional load
 
ing. The advantage of increasing the threshold limit is the
 
buffering effect created. Errors due to nonidentical unfailed
 
servosystems are less likely to be a source of nuisance trips
 
if there is a sufficient buffer band.
 
Possible sources of comparison errors in unfailed servo­
systems. - Any characteristic which is not identical between
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corresponding servosystems is a source of comparison error.
 
For example, the gains of each component in one servosystem
 
may differ from those of the other servosystem due to manu­
facturing tolerances. In flight, the servosystem differences
 
might be caused by aerodynamic loading. Electrical properties
 
in corresponding components will be different. These types
 
of differences give rise to error sources such as ERVS thres­
hold error, servosystem hysteresis error and rate limit error.
 
LVDT demodulator ripple error. - Each servosystem LVDT
 
demodulator has a ripple signal superimposed on it. These
 
signals are from a single 1800 hertz oscillator and therefore,
 
,they will be in phase. As described earlier, the demodulator
 
output sampling for corresponding surfaces occurs twenty-five
 
microseconds apart.
 
Each right and left demodulator output is equal to the
 
sum of the dc voltage, Vo, and the approximately sinusoidal
 
ripple voltage, Vrsin(360ft). The frequency, f, is the oscil­
lator frequency and the ripple amplitude, VR, is equal to
 
0.0711Vo (ref. 3). The sampling time difference, with re­
spect to the error between demodulator outputs, can be thought
 
of as a phase difference between corresponding right and left
 
demodulator output signals, VDR and VDL. Therefore, the right
 
and left demodulator outputs are,
 
VDL = Vo + VRsin(360ft) (1)
 
-
VDR = Vo + VRsin(360f(t + 2.5 x 10 5 ) (2a)
 
or,
 
VDR = Vo + VRsin(360ft + 16.2) (2b)
 
Two types of errors due to the ripple signal could occur.
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One type would be characteristic of the symmetrically moving
 
surfaces and the other would be characteristic of the antisym­
metrically moving surfaces.
 
Taking the case of the symmetrically moving surfaces, the
 
difference of the right and left demodulator outputs would be
 
determined in the on-board microcomputer. All other things
 
being equal (neglecting the analog-to-digital conversion ef­
fects), the error value determined would be the difference in
 
the two ripple signal equations,l and 2b.
 
ripple error = VRsin(360ft) - sin(360ft + 16.2
 
(3)
 
Figure 7a illustrates the error value for a plus 10 de­
gree surface deflection.
 
For the case of the antisymmetrically moving surfaces,
 
the right and left outputs have opposite polarity and so they
 
would be added to produce an error signal. The error value
 
would be the sum of equations 1 and 2b.
 
ripple error = vR sin(360ft) + sin(360ft + 16.2 (4)
 
Figure 7b illustrates the error value for a plus and minus 10
 
degree surface deflection.
 
The worst-case ripple error for symmetrically deflected
 
surfaces, deflected 20 degrees, would be significant. The
 
worst-case sampling instant would occur at a point in time
 
when the argument of the sine wave is at minus 8.1 degrees.
 
After a 25 microsecond delay, when the argument of the sine
 
wave is plus 8.1 degrees, the opposite position output would be
 
sampled. According to equation 3, the ripple error magnitude
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would be approximately 0.11 volts which corresponds to a false
 
error between surface positions of approximately 0.4 degrees.
 
This would be a potential source of nuisance trips because of
 
the comparable value to the computer threshold limit for sym­
metrically moving surfaces. A possible solution to this con­
dition would be to filter the LVDT demodulator output with a
 
low-pass filter to attenuate the ripple signal.
 
The worst-case ripple error for antisymmetrically moving
 
surfaces, deflected 20 degrees, would be more severe. The
 
worst-case sampling is at a point.in time when the first sam­
ple is taken just before the ripple signal reaches a peak val­
ue. The first position output would be sampled when the sine
 
wave argument is 81.8 degrees. After the cycle delay, the
 
opposite position output would be sampled, and again the
 
argument would be 81.8 degrees. Using equation 4 the ripple
 
error magnitude would be'approximately 0.78 volts. This cor­
responds to a false indication of approximately 2.8 degrees,
 
an excessive error. Again, a possible solution might be to
 
filter the LVDT demodulator with a low-pass filter to attenu­
ate the ripple signal, and thus, the error. Filtering, how­
ever, would involve additional hardware and analysis. This
 
presents a problem because of an already compacted hardware
 
arrangement.
 
For small surface deflections (less than one degree) the
 
quantization error masks the ripple error for both symmetric
 
and antisymmetric surfaces. Increasing deflections cause the
 
ripple error for antisymmetric surfaces to dominate. The rip­
ple error for symmetric surfaces is not a factor for a deflec­
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tion under 8.0 degrees, due to the quantization error.
 
The effect of the ripple error in both cases would be to
 
increase the probability of nuisance trips. For large sur­
face deflections and computer threshold values as calculated,
 
it is almost certain that a nuisance trip would occur. Filter­
ing the demodulator output appears to be the most effective
 
solution to this problem.
 
COMPUTER MODEL
 
The advantages of using a computer program to model the
 
CSCM technique are listed below:
 
o 	 Straightforward implementation of nonlinear as
 
well as linear characteristics
 
o 	 Amount of error that each component variation con­
tributes is readily identified
 
o 	 Servosystem changes can be made quickly and easily
 
o Data can be easily formated for automatic plotting
 
The formulation of the FORTRAN program used for evaluat­
ing the CSCM technique is discussed. The initial linear mod­
el is described after which the non-linear affects are added
 
and the resulting model described.
 
Linear Model
 
A linear model was formulated to which other elements
 
were included to more closely represent the actual servosystem.
 
Once the servosystem was modeled the CSCM technique was repre­
sented 	using two servosystem models. Ease of including non­
linear 	blocks was a design goal for the linear model. A
 
brief description of the servosystem and the characteristics
 
of the components are given. Simplifying assumptions and
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verification of the model performance is described.
 
Description. - The objective, when modeling the servo­
system and subsequently the CSCM technique for failure de­
tection, was to match the model behavior as closely as pos­
sible to the physical system behavior, within the anticipated
 
operating range. For the physical system with command signal
 
frequencies of up to 13 hertz, the unloaded servosystem re­
sponse was very near that of an ideal low-pass filter (ref. 3).
 
The servosystem actuator dynamics contribute a closed-loop
 
pole at 13 hertz. The other servosystem elements have dynamic
 
response characteristics as follows (ref. 3):
 
Servoamplifier G ( 628 
(for signals up to 4 s + 628/
 
20% of rated output
 
current)
 
EHiSV _GV( 580 (__4 06 
s+ 580/ + 5406/
 
LVDT Demodulator G (628)
 
The model of the servosystem was structured such that
 
each mathematical expression in the code corresponded to a
 
component of the actual servosystem. Initially the inputs and
 
outputs were zero. One iteration of the code corresponded to
 
one time increment and generated one set of output values. A
 
flowchart of the model is shown in figure 8. For the first
 
iteration the feedback value was assumed to be zero. The in­
put to the EHSV block was then equal to just the command am­
plifier output. As outputs were calculated, the input to the
 
next block was set equal to the output of the preceding block.
 
The loop was closed after the first iterati6r because the
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error signal value (the input to the EHSV for the next itera­
tion) was the difference between the command amplifier output
 
and the feedback amplifier output (see figure 5). In the
 
physical system the LVDT demodulator is reverse polarity with
 
respect to the command signal. The FORTRAN model of the.LVDT
 
demodulator output had the same polarity as the command sig­
nal for convenient analysis.
 
The modeling of the CSCM technique was made up of two
 
servosystem models to represent the canard control surfaces.
 
This was designed to allow one servosystem model to have nom­
inal gains according to table 3 and the other to be varied,
 
for sensitivity test purposes. The resulting error between
 
the two models was of interest in determining the effects of
 
disproportionate servosystems. The same command value was ap­
plied to each servosystem. The output values of each LVDT de­
modulator block were converted to the equivalent control sur­
face deflection. The first servosystem model corresponded to
 
the right control surface. The error value between surfaces
 
was the difference of the left surface from the right surface,
 
where the left surface corresponded to the second model. The
 
appendix contains a computer listing of the FORTRAN program.
 
Figure 5 shows a block diagram of the servosystem and CSCM
 
method.
 
Simplifying assumptions. - A reasonable assumption con­
cerning the frequency of the command input signal was that it
 
would not be higher than 15 hertz. It follows that the EHSV,
 
the LVDT and LVDT demodulator, and servoamplifier dynamics
 
would cause negligible attenuation and phase shift. These
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elements were modeled as pure gain elements. The actuator was
 
conveniently modeled as an integrator and implemented in the
 
digital program using the bilinear transformation expression
 
(ref. 7,8). For the Kth iteration,
 
outputK = outputK_1 + T/2 (inputK t input K-l)
 
where T is the sample period, that is, the time between itera­
tions and was nominally 0.2 milliseconds, 5000 hertz itera­
tion rate. To obtain sufficient accuracy using the bilinear
 
transformation expression for the integrator, the sample fre­
quency was set much higher than the first-order pole of the
 
model (greater by a factor of ten or more). The past input
 
and output values were updated with each iteration:
 
Verification. - The CONTROL digital computer program
 
(ref. 9), a program for analyzing linear continuous systems,
 
was used to verify that the discrete model was an accurate
 
representation of the linear first-order model of the simplex
 
servosystem. Time history responses, of the control model and
 
the discrete model, were compared. There was no detectable
 
difference. The CSCM model was also verified by using two
 
servosystem models in each program to simulate the CSCM. In
 
both programs the difference of one servosystem monitor output
 
from the other was computed to give an error value. The mod­
els corresponding to the right servosystem in each program had
 
equal gains and the models corresponding to the left servo­
systems had equal gains but the right and left sides were un­
equal. As can be seen in figures 9a and 9b, for a step input
 
and a sine wave input, the discrete model compares very close­
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ly to the linear continuous model.
 
Non-linear Model
 
The following subsection describes the non-linearities
 
that were added to the linear model. T The origin of these non­
linearities and the likelihood of any contribution to the
 
error between unfailed actuators is discussed. The assump­
tions that were made in implementing these characteristics
 
and the verification procedures are given.
 
Description. - The non-linearities that were added to the
 
model are among the more common ones associated with servo­
systems. The non-linear characteristics added were:
 
o EHSV current limiting
 
o EHSV threshold current
 
o Actuator ram position limit
 
o Total servosystem hysteresis
 
The EHSV provides the electrical-to-hydraulic interface
 
which controls the source of fluid power to the hydraulic act­
uator. The EHSV rated current range changes the fluid flow,
 
to the actuator, from maximum extension control flow to maxi­
mum retraction control flow. The servoamplifier supplies cur­
rent to the EHSV within the specified range, plus or minus 4
 
milliampheres (ref. 3)
 
The EHSV threshold current non-linearity is essentially
 
a characteristic produced by the static friction of the slid­
ing valve. The specified threshold value was determined by
 
the manufacturer during quality assurance tests. The current
 
increment required to reverse the EHSV from a condition of in­
creasing output was measured. The current was changed at a
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a rate below that at which dynamic effects were important.
 
The actuator ram position limit is the maximum extension
 
or retraction distance from the null position. For the CSCM
 
model the full stroke (F.S.) of the actuator ram was approxi­
mately 2.56 cm (ref. 3). The position limits were plus and
 
minus one half of this amount.
 
The actuator ram rate limit is the rate at which the ram
 
can extend or retract under no-load conditions with maximum
 
control flow from the EHSV. The rate limit is dependent on
 
the properties of the other components in the loop. A change
 
in loop gain may affect the rate limit as will a change in the
 
maximum control flow from the EHSV. The current limit imple­
mentation was in effect a rate limit since a decrease in the
 
current maximum output would decrease the control flow maxi­
mum output. The actuator ram rate limit used was 5.87 cm per
 
second (ref. 3).
 
The total servosystem hysteresis is defined as the maxi­
mum difference in command voltages required to produce the
 
same actuator ram position during a single cycling of the com­
mand voltage. This cycling is done below the rate at which
 
dynamic effects are important. The hysteresis non-linear
 
characteristicis produced by the combined effects of the EHSV
 
threshold and electromagnetic characteristics, and the static
 
friction of the actuator ram.
 
Simplifying assumptions. - There were some general as­
sumptions made to simplify the implementation of the non
 
linear discrete model. Although a non-linearity in the phy­
sical system may be a function of several variables, in the
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discrete model each non-linearity was assumed to .be only a
 
function of the input to that non-linear block. The linear
 
representation of each servosystem element was retained. For
 
example, in implementing the EHSV current limit characteristic,
 
the EHSV input value was tested to determine if it was great­
er than or less than the limit values. If so, it was set
 
equal to the appropriate limit value. The expression for
 
EHSV behavior was not affected, it remained a pure gain ele­
ment.
 
It was assumed that the non-linearities would be closely
 
approximated as ideal non-linearities. For example, the
 
total hysteresis value, as measured, might not be uniform for
 
the full stroke of the actuator ram in the physical system.
 
It was assumed to be uniform for the non-linear implementation
 
in the discrete model.
 
It was also assumed, for the discrete model, that because
 
the EHSV threshold produces a hysteresis non-linearity in the
 
closed-loop response, the total hysteresis could be modeled
 
by adjusting the threshold value. The position limits were
 
included in the model. A difference in the position limits
 
would produce an error between surfaces only at the maximum
 
deflections. This effect was not investigated. A difference
 
in the current limits of the EHSV would amount to a difference
 
in the rate limit, which was investigated.
 
Verification. - The current limiter, and position and
 
rate limiters are shown in figures 10a and 10b, respectively.
 
The 10 degree command sine wave is shown in figure 10a along
 
with the resulting input current waveform of the EHSV which
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was limited to plus or minus 4 milliamperes. Figure 10b
 
shows the ram position and the maximum positive ram extension
 
of 1.28 centimeters and also the maximum extension rate of
 
5.87 centimeters per second for a 25 degree step command. The
 
threshold non-linearity is shown in figure 11 and hysteresis
 
non-linearity,resulting from the closed loop response,is shown
 
in figure 12. The horizontal axis is the input and the ver­
tical axis is the output of the non-linear block. The non
 
linear block diagram is shown in figure 13. The inputs label­
ed N1 and N2 are points where noise was introduced into the
 
model.
 
COMPUTER ANALYSIS
 
The objectives and procedures for the parameter sensitiv­
ity test of the CSCM technique are given. This test uses the
 
nonlinear digital model described in the preceding section.
 
Objectives
 
There were five main objectives in testing the sensitiv­
ity of various parameters in the CSCM technique
 
1. Determine the sensitivity of the error between
 
servosystem LVDT demodulator outputs to variations in the
 
values of the threshold and rate limit non-linearities.
 
2. Determine the effect of loop gain differences on
 
the error between servosystems.
 
3. Investigate the effect typical system noise may
 
have on the error between servosystems.
 
4. Investigate the demodulator ripple, sampling time
 
difference, and digital-to-analog and analog-to-digital con­
version errors.
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5. Determine the total effect on the error value for
 
two servosystems with reasonable differences in characteris­
tics.
 
Using the data from the tests a judgement was made as to
 
the impact of nonidentical servosystems on the performance of
 
the CSCM failure detection technique. Potential solutions to
 
problems that were evident were then formulated.
 
Test Procedure
 
The test objectives were met by varying the parameters of
 
interest and collecting data on the response of the CSCM error­
value. The input command for each case was a six degree step
 
command, a somewhat severe command but appropriate for the
 
test.
 
Loop gain variations. - In order to study the effect of
 
loop gain differences the gains of the left servosystem ele­
ments were set to the nominal values (see table 3). The right
 
servosystem loop gain was theh changed for each case by chang­
ing the dc gain of the actuator. The difference between the
 
two servosystem gains would most likely be less than six per­
cent. This is because the design specifications cite an over­
all system gain accuracy of plus or minus three precent for
 
the test. The right servosystem loop gain was varied from
 
80 percent to 120 percent of the nominal value in five percent
 
increments. The error magnitude, in degrees, for a step input
 
is shown in figure 14. Notice that for the higher than nomin­
al loop gains the error was zero for a time. This is due to
 
the fact that the rate limiter was holding both actuator rates
 
equal. Only when the actuators came off the rate limit was
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an error seen. For cases where the loop gain of the right
 
servosystem is less.than the nominal value, the rate limit is
 
less than.nominal. Therefore, the error varies according to
 
the difference between rate limits.
 
Rate limit variations. - The rate limit of the left
 
servosystem model was held at the nominal specification while
 
the right servosystem model had a rate limit variation from
 
90 percent to 110 percent in two percent increments. For one
 
case, the left servosystem was set at 110 percent while the
 
right servosystem was set at 90 percent of the nominal spec­
ifications. The eleven cases are shown in figure 15a. The
 
current limiter was excluded to allow excursions of the rate
 
limit beyond that fixed by the current limiter. When the cur­
rent limiter was included there was no error. The right
 
servosystem rate limit was set higher because the EHSV cur­
rent limit was already limiting the rate to the nominal value
 
in both servosystems. Figure 15b illustrates the result of
 
the same test cases with the current limits included.
 
EHSV threshold and total hysteresis. - The design spec­
ifications for the simplex servosystems give an EHSV thres­
hold value and a total servosystem hysteresis value, 0.7 per­
cent and 0.15 percent of full stroke (F.S.), respectively. In
 
the servosystem model, the EHSV threshold non-linearity im­
plementation gives the hysteresis characteristic in the
 
closed-loop response. One set of cases was run using the
 
EHSV threshold specification for the left servosystem and vary­
ing the threshold value of the right servosystem in integral
 
amounts up to ten times the nominal value. This set of cases
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is shown in figure 16a. Again, there was no error until both
 
servosystem models came off the rate limiters.
 
In order to model the total hysteresis, the threshold
 
value of the EHSV was set to give the nominal hysteresis value
 
for the left servosystem while the right servosystem was
 
varied in integral amounts up to ten times the nominal value.
 
Figure 16b shows the test results for a six degree step input,
 
Servosystem noise. - The effect of various types of noise
 
on the error between servosystem models was investigated using
 
a software pseudo-random noise generator. The noise signal
 
was introduced at the EHSV input and at the demodulator out­
put. Two cases using a different level of noise in each case
 
were run for both noise input points. For the EHSV input, the
 
noise level in each case was 0.1 percent of the maximum signal
 
input (4.0 mA) and 3.0 percent of the maximum signal input.
 
This is shown in figure 17a and 17b, respectively. For the
 
demodulator output, the noise level in each case was 0.1 per­
cent and 3.0 percent of the maximum demodulator output (5.61
 
Vdc) as shown in figure 17c, and 17d, respectively. The sam­
pled values of the output were shown in these cases illustrat­
ing the values the on-board computer would be operating on.
 
Combined effects. - The combined effects of the previous
 
sources of differences between servosystems were investigated.
 
The left servosystem was set to the nominal specifications and
 
the right servosystem characteristics were as shown in table
 
5. The resulting test plots are shown in Figure 18a-d.
 
Ripple error and sampling time differences. - For these
 
test cases the demodulator ripple is added to the do voltage
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(a) Noise signal of 0.1% introduced at the EHSV input.
 
Figure 17.- Surface responses and monitor error
 
for a 	step command.
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Figure 17..- Continued.
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(c) Noise signal of 0.1% introduced at the demodulator input.
 
Figure 17.- Continued.
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(d) Noise signal of 3.0% introduced at the demodulator output.
 
Figure 17.- Concluded.
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RIGHT SERVOSYSTEM
 
CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 CASE 4
 
Loop gain 97% 99% 97% 99%
 
Rate limit 95% 99% 95% 99%
 
Threshold 95% 99% 95% 99%
 
Hysteresis 95% 99% 95% 99% 
EHSV input noise 2% 1% - ­
demodulator 
Output noise 2% 1% - -
LEFT SERVOSYSTEM
 
CASE 1-4
 
Loop gain 80
 
Rate limit 5.87 cm/sec
 
Threshold 0.7% of F.S.
 
Hysteresis 0.04% of F.S.
 
EHSV input noise
 
Demodulator output noise
 
TABLE 5
 
SUMMARY OF SERVOSYSTEM CONDITIONS FOR
 
INVESTIGATION OF COMBINED SERVOSYSTEM DIFFERENCES
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(a) Servosystem conditions as specified in case 1 of table 5.
 
Figure 18.- Surface responses and monitor error for
 
a step command.
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(b) Servosystem conditions ds specified in case 2 of table 5.
 
Figure 18.- Continued.
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Figure 18.- Continued.
 
61
 
0.04
 
r,-
Cb 
b 
-0.00 
C 20.0 
C 
ci 
o 0.00 
00 
LzA 
4.00 
ti-­
go00 
8.00 
0 0 '0 0.66 0 100.20-1 
64.00 
I­
._0 
0.0O0 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.08 
TIME HISTORY.,SEC 
(d) Servosystem conditions as specified in case 
Figure 18.- Concluded. 
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0.10 O.12 
4 of table 5. 
0.14 
output according to equations 1. To simulate this sampling
 
time difference in the CSCM model, the ripple signals for each
 
side are set out of phase by 16.2 degrees. The input command
 
signal is a series of step inputs held to the command input
 
rate limit of 100 degrees per second and with a final value of
 
six degrees. The demodulator output samples are shown along
 
with the actual waveform. The symmetric case is shown in fig­
ure 19a and the antisymmetric case is shown in figure 19b.
 
The ripple waveform shown has a much lower frequency (ninth
 
harmonic) because of the iteration rate (1000 sps). It serves
 
to illustrate the amplitude, however.
 
COMPUTER ANALYSIS RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
 
The computer analysis provided information as to the rela­
tive contribution of the possible error sources (loop gain,
 
rate limit, threshold and hysteresis, system noise, and demod­
ulator ripple) to the amount of detected error between servo­
system position monitors. The error magnitudes, for test cases
 
with varying differences between right and left servosystems
 
(as shown in table 5), provides an estimate of the integrity of
 
the CSCM failure detection method. That is, the likelihood of
 
nuisance trips, for the computer threshold limits of table 4,
 
may be hypothesized.
 
The loop gain variations shown in figure 14 indicate that
 
the worst-case difference of six percent would contribute a
 
peak value of approximately 0.3 degrees to the error. For the
 
canard threshold limit of 3.65 degrees (assuming a maximum of
 
90 degrees per second error rate), this error would not contri­
bute significantly to the likelihood of a nuisance trip. For
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(a) Ripple signal added to the demodulator
 
output of symmetrically moving surfaces.
 
Figure is.- Surface responses and monitor
 
errfor a tpcommand. 
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(b) Ripple signal added to the demodulator
 
output of antisymmetrically moving surfades.
 
Figure 19.- Concluded.
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the aileron and elevator threshold limits of 0.65 and 0.69 de­
grees., respectively, a 0.3 degree contribution to the error
 
value would increase the likelihood of a nuisance trip consid­
erably. The loop gains should be matched as closely as possible
 
to minimize this error contribution.
 
A difference between servosystem rate limits has the same
 
effect, on the error value, as does differences in loop gains.
 
Figure 15a and 15b illustrate the type of error response for a
 
six degree step command. The maximum rate is dependent on the
 
loading of the hydraulic actuator, in the physical system. For
 
asymmetric aerodynamic loading on the control surfaces, the
 
computer analysis indicates that the error rate varies accord­
ing to the difference between right and left surface deflection
 
rates. Thus, for a difference in surface rates of twenty-five
 
percent and a six degree step command, the maximum error would
 
be approximately 1.25 degrees. This would cause a nuisance
 
trip in the aileron or elevator servosystems. Such an
 
asymmetric load would be likely only for antisymmetrically mov­
ing surfaces.
 
The loop gain and rate limit analysis results may be summar­
ized as follows. For each percent difference in loop gain (re­
presenting a static error) or rate limit (representing an error
 
due to asymmetric loading), an error of approximately 0.9 de­
grees will be contributed with each second the surfaces are
 
commanded at the maximum rate. Whichever factor is larger
 
should determine the error contribution.
 
The error contribution due to differences in the threshold
 
non-linearity (shown in figure 16a) is insignificant for dif­
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ferences of as much as 500 percent. Hysteresis differences of
 
as much as 300 percent were also shown to have a negligible con­
tribution to the error (shown in figure l6b).
 
The effect of noise in the system due to the EHSV is shown
 
in figures 17a and 17b. This noise could be from the environ­
ment or it could be thought of as state noise resulting from
 
the unmodeled characteristics of the servovalve. The effects
 
were attentuated by the actuator. The curve resembles the
 
curves for differences in rate limit because in the model the
 
noise was added to the EHSV input. This resulted in a larger
 
than 4 milliampere input current and thu4 a larger control flow.
 
Looking at just the amplitude of the error curve gives a more
 
realistic view of the effect of noise sources in the EHSV. The
 
effect on the error for a three percent addition of random
 
white noise appears to be negligible.
 
The error contribution from noise introduced at the demodu­
lator output is shown in figures 18a and 18b. This is a signi­
ficant problem for the CSCM method because any nonidentical
 
signals introduced at this point directly affects the error
 
magnitude. This has already been illustrated by the problem
 
associated with the demodulator ripple. An average difference
 
in the demodulator outputs of 3.0 percent due to system noise
 
results in an error that approaches 2.0 degrees. Filtering of
 
the demodulator output will attenuate the high frequency noise
 
but a compromise would have to be made in choosing the cut-off
 
frequency. The actual position information could not be atten­
uated which would result in selection of a filter cut-off fre­
quency that would not attenuate low frequencies. The extent
 
of the noise problem would most effectively be determined by
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actual measurements on the vehicle servosystems.
 
The combined effects are shown in figures 18a-18d. The de­
modulator noise overshadowed the error contributions from other
 
sources. The error contributions in the physical system will
 
not always be additive as was the case in these tests. This
 
set of tests was a worst-case situation which used a range of
 
differences that could be expected in the servosystems. The
 
elevator and aileron servosystems with nominal computer thres­
hold limits of 0.69 and 0.65 degrees, respectively, would be
 
likely to cause a nuisance trip under the conditions of test
 
case 1 or 2. The two canard servosystems could be very unlike­
ly to cause a nuisance trip in any of the cases because of the
 
wide buffer band created by a computer threshold limit of ap­
proximately 3.65 degrees.
 
The effect of the demodulator ripple voltage was analyzed
 
pieviously for the symmetrically and antisymmetrically deflect­
ed surfaces. The two test cases are shown in figures 19a and
 
19b, respectively, for a sampled, rate-limited command of six
 
degrees. The sampled command input does not appear to have a
 
significant effect on the servosystem or the error value. The
 
error magnitude for symmetrically moving surfaces, approximate­
ly 0.1 degrees, would be of some concern in the case of the
 
elevators because of the small threshold limit and the result­
ing small buffer band. In the case of the antisymmetrically
 
moving surfaces, the error magnitude of approximately 1.0 de­
grees would be critical for the ailerons since it exceeds the
 
computer threshold limit. The nearly 25 percent decrease
 
in the width of the canard buffer band would be undesirable
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although it would be unlikely to cause a nuisance trip in itself.
 
As mentioned earlier, filtering the demodulator output will re­
duce the ripple voltage error.
 
The modeling of the CSCM method might have been more precise
 
had the higher-order dynamics and other possible non-linearities
 
been included. The most probable servosystem variations in
 
characteristics were not known which resulted in somewhat
 
arbitrary choices for the ranges used in the computer analysis.
 
The trends of the sensitivities to various differences, how-.
 
ever, were clear. The probable effect of system noise was dem­
onstrated but the choice of the magnitude was arbitrary. The
 
amount of noise in the servosystems would best be determined by
 
measurement of the physical system. The computer analysis re­
sults could then be used to approximate the error magnitude.
 
The expected error contribution from each-error source is sum­
marized in table 6.
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
 
The investiagtionof the cross-ship comparison monitoring
 
(CSCM) method of failure detection revealed several problems
 
associated with the technique. The selection of the appropriate
 
computer threshold limit involves a trade-off between the pos­
sibility of a nuisance trip and the assurance that an actual
 
failure will be detected in time.
 
There are several error sources which, if decreased or elim­
inated, would lessen the likelihood of a nuisance trip. These
 
possible errors, due to differences between corresponding right
 
and left servosystems for the canardr aileron, and elevator con­
trol surfaces, are as listed:
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ERROR SOURCES 

Loop gain or 

rate limit 

Threshold 

Hysteresis 

EHSV input 

noise 

Ripple voltage
 
for symmetrically 

deflected 

surfaces
 
Ripple voltage
 
for anti­
symmetrically 

deflected 

surfaces
 
APPROXIMATE ERROR 

CONTRIBUTION 

0.9 deg/second at 

maximum surface
 
rate
 
7 x 10-5 deg 

2.6 x 10-4 deg 

-3
 
2 x 10 deg 

0.02 deg/ deg of 

deflection
 
0.14 deg/deg of 

deflection
 
TABLE 6
 
AMOUNTS OF
 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
 
SERVOSYSTEMS
 
1%
 
1%
 
1%
 
1%
 
0%
 
0%
 
SUMMARY OF ERROR SOURCES AND THE RELATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS FOR
 
A 1% DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SERVOSYSTEMS
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O 	 Ripple voltage on the demodulator output.
 
o 	 Electrical noise on the demodulator output.
 
o 	 Asymmetric loading of the antisymmetrically moving
 
control surfaces.
 
o 	 Nonidentical loop gains.
 
The ripple voltage and electrical noise on the demodulator
 
output signal could be attenuated by filtering the demodulator
 
output. The low-frequency noise would still be present, how­
ever.
 
The problem due to asymmetric loading of the antisymmetrical­
ly moving surfaces could be a severe problem and should be ana­
lyzed further.
 
Nonidentical loop gains may be adjusted by changing the gain
 
of the feedback amplifiers. Sufficient differences in the hy­
draulic components may require replacing the EHSV and servoactu­
ator in one servosystem.
 
The likelihood of a nuisance trip may also be decreased by
 
increasing the computer threshold limit. Decreasing the trans­
fer delay time by using a faster switching relay for the lock
 
up solenoid would allow a larger computer threshold limit to
 
be selected. The selection of the computer threshold limit de­
pends on the anticipated error rate. The error rate could be
 
greater than or less than the maximum surface rate. The error
 
rate, to some extent, depends on the commanded surface rate at
 
the time of the failure. Therefore, the threshold limit should
 
be chosen with the recognition that the error rate is dependent
 
on the flight condition at the time of failure.
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APPENDIX
 
CSCM COMPUTER MODEL
 
PROGRAM LISTING
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10 
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40 
50 
73574 oPr i FTN 4. ' 75060 O/1 I/?R 12.11.00. PAGE 
r4C. #.#44*4**..*..54. * *. .. * ............... ** *44.....
 
C 
C CRCSSNIP COMPARE REDUNDANCY MA'IAGEMENT .OOE4L F A TYrF n SE'O­
5 C 
C 
SYSTEM LOOF GAINS ARE TAKEN FP(N UPDATFO HR INFO MATION, 
A eELINEAP IRAHSFORN IS USED FOP tHF IMFLFHENTATIOON OF TIlE INTF-
C GRATOR WITH ADDITIONAL NONLINEAFITICS CALLED AS SU9g'OLTINES. THE 
C CUTPUTS TAKEN FFD' THE DEIIOULATOPS ARE DIFFERENCFF A110 THE ERROI 
C IS GIVEN IN TERMS OF THE OIFEEPENSE IN 'UlrACE PCSITION IQEGPEES). 
C J. WOLF 10/77 
C 
C­
1 C 
C THIS IS THE INITIALIZATION FVPTION. THE GAIN 
C VALUES WILL BE FEAD, INITIAL CONDITIONS SET 
C AND HFACINGS PRINTED. 
C 
PROGRAM JXCCIINPUTOUTPUTTAPFI=INPUTTAPE3SDUTPUTTAPE4,TAPE6I 
C 
REAL LVOT 
REAL LVDOUT2),LVOTIN(2),AGTl()0 
DIMENSION AMP(2) .EHSVI),ACT(Z),LVDT2IDEIODIZI FF.En(l 
CIMEVSIOI AMFIN(2),AMPCUT(2)EfSVIN(2EflSJUT(), ACTIN(2, ACTOUT2 
*)3AGTI 0 (2,FEEDIN(2),FDOUT(R?,OEHODII2I,DEMOOO(Z)YYDUTI) 
COMMON TI'ENFTSTHSPEC(2)RLSPEC(2)HYS'EC(2) NCASES 0 
WRITE(3, 0) 
20 FORAT(IHI,////2XCRSSHIP CCMPARE REDUDANCY MANAGEMENT OF THE dR 
35 C 
-TYPE "B" SERVOSYSTE$',/.DXJ. WOLFtO?/l 
C 
C IF THE MO. OF POINTS IS GREftTFP THAN 400 
C THE CCMMANO IS A 6.0 3nEEF FTEP INPUT. IF 
C THE NO. C- POINTS IS EQUAL TO 400 THE INPUT 
c IS A !IKE WAVE OF AMPLITUDE ECUALING 5.0 
C DFGREFS AID FREDUENCY OF 5.0 HERT. IF THE 
C NO. CF 'FOINTS IS LESS THAN 400 THE COMMAND 
C IS A NHITF NOISE SINAL OF ZFPO MEAN AND 
C STANIOARC DEVIATTON OF 10 O!GREE. 
45 C 
C 
c 
C FIRST DATA CARD GIVES THE NO. OF CAFES (15) 
C 
PFAD(jI9INCASES 
9 FORHAT(I5) 
C 
IRITE(3.99)NCASES 
99 FORMAT(//1OXT.HE NO. CF CA5F IS' GI// 
55 C 
00 1IZ K=INCASES 
C 
12.11.00o PAGE 2 
0
 
0
 
PROG"AM JCC 73/74 01=i 

C 28 FONr/2OtCS O. 

60 WRITC(~,2f)K 
28 PORNAT(//20Y,*GASE NO. 
C 
C 

C 

65 C
 
FEAO($1,11SSRATE.NPT

1t FOFAT(F5.Z,2XI5)
 
G 
WRITE(3,24)SSRATE.NPTS
 
70 24 FORAT(/IOX,*THE SAHPLE 
*ES EOUALSI,4//) 
C 
o 

C 

75 C 
0o 100 I=i,2 
WPITE(2,21)I
 
IeI
 
*,r2,//)
 
THP S6HPLE RAT-

AND ALSC THE 10. 

RA'E INC.F9.3,X 
FT '.2f15060 05/11/70 

QC THE SFRYVOYSTEM IS READ 
IF DATA POINTS. 
OF SAMPL 
SFRVOSYSTEN GAINS A E READ PFO THE THIRD 
DATA CAID IN A CASE. CjO. FOPHAT 
.21 FORNAI(/2OX,*SEPVOSYSTEH *,It .... GAINS',f3 
WRITE(3,22) 
22 FOPHATiIDX,&HPLIFIED0 ,12X,'EHV',t5X,'ADTJATOR',ttY,'LVTISX, 
DEHCDULATCR 7X,*FEEDBAC ) 
ul A5 WRITE(3,222) 
222 FORFTAT (I OX," MAtVDC 1XINrC A,9c IN-2 ,fVC/N 
-,13X," VOC/VAC ",?X," NA/VDOCf)t 
G 
REAn~i,IOIARF(I),RHSVCI),Ar.T(I),LVITi1).OE4" (I),F{FriI 
90 10 FORNAT(6(FIC.41) 
c 
WRITE(3,23)AMP(fIlEH3VtI) ,ACT(Ih)LVOT(I)OElOD (T)FFFO(I) 
23'FORHAT(1OX,6IF8,4,1tX)// 
C 
95 C OEADOAtO, PATE LImIt, AND HYqTERESIS VALUES 
C ARE INPUT AS PEFCNTAFS OF ACTUATOR FULL 
O STrOKF SFCIFTATiO S. WITH THE OEADEANO 
O SPECIFICATION IT IS WITH FESPECT TO MAXIMUM 
c SERVOkALV5 INPUT SPECIFICATIrNS(+/- 4MAI. 
FEAD(I,710)TSPEO(I),RLSPECII,HYSPEC(I)

710 FORMA1(3(FI.7l) 
THSPE(I) = HYSP5C(I) / t.'6.9g9'20. 
105 WRITL( 0,13) 
713 FORAT(t0XWHYSTERESIS AND OCACOANO ARE GIVEN 
'STROKE. PATE LIOIT IS GIVEN AS PE'CENT OF 90 
C 
C 
110 WRITE{3,71lITIISPEC(IRLSPrCIIHysPFCcI)
 
AS PFPCENT OF FULL 
DEG/SFC. ///)
 
Tit FCPtA(1CX,LOOPIIXI1./fl%0,T4PESNOLO VALUE z-,m>FIO.7./UX w 
*RATE LIMIT =-,qXFtO.7,/tOX.-HYSTE!SESr VA-UF =t,3YFlO.7.//I
 
LO CONTINUE
 
C
 
'ROGRA4 JXCC 73/74 OPt=e FTN 4. 2 75060 05/11/78 12.11.00. PAGE 3 
115 C 
C 
LID -Lq AFr CHOS'N T) 2FSCRI"IF IHE VARIAOLF. 
INITIAL IATION CF VARIA4LES AND INI'IAL 
C CONOITTON APF ZET-JP. 
C 
120 
FFRIOO = i.0/SSRITE 
ERROR = C.0 
ICNT = 0 
C 
YYIN =q.0 
TIME = 0.0 
125 00 101 1=1,2 
APPIN(Il =0.0 
AMPOUT(r)=o.0 
E SVIN(I)=G.B 
E"SOU1(1)=0.U 
i30 ACTI(JI =a.0 
ACTOUTIl=C.O 
LVOTIN(T)=0.O 
LVOOUT(II=0.0
FEEOIN(I)=0.0 
135 FOCUT(I) =0.0 
OEMODI(I)=0.0 
•C 
DEHODOI)=0.0 
YYOUT(I) =0.0 
10 C ACTINF IS THE PREVI3US ACTUATOR INPUT AND 
C ACTI IS THE PREVIOUS ACTUATOP OUTPUT. THIS 
C SET OF VA41ABLES IS FOP THE nILINFAR TRANS-
C FORM OF THE INTEGRAtOR. 
C 
145 ACTINPII)=O.O 
ACTIJ) 0. 
1 CONTINUE 
ISO 
C 
c 
THERE Apr TWO SERVOSYSTEM LOCFS IN THIS 
MODEL. LOOP I rEORESENITS A FIGHT AILERON 
C 09 CANAFO, LCOP 2 REPRESFNTT THE LEFT. ALL 
C CHANGES IN THF FFRV)SYSTEM CHARACTEFISTICS 
O ARE OFPFOONEP ON THE RIGHT UFFACE WITH THE 
C LEFT ACTING AS A REFEUENCE GE CONTROL. 
±55 C 
C 
C ALTHOUGH TH SIGNAL IN THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM 
C IS INVERTEO AT THE LVT OCMOtLLAICR THE 
C MODEL DOES NOT INVERT THE SIGNAL UNTIL THE 
160 C SltlMIG JUNCTIOH TO PROVIDE A CLEAR PLOT 
C PRFENTATION. 
C 
25 
WRITE(3,26) 
FORMAI(/I2X,-TIME4,0X,COPAN INPUTT,IOX,EFPOP GUTFUT',15XLO0 
165 'P il.12XLOOP 2(/EX(SFC)%13X, ( ) *,14 O (DEG) *,j3X, 
C 
*. (CEG) *,9X,I (DEC) 'i 
C UI lu TP SUgVOUTINE INPUT A CCMMANf INPUT 
C IS rFkiEFATE. 
170 F 
CALL INPLT(YYIN) 
PIOGAM JXCG 73/74 fOPT-l F.N 4. '#75060 05/11/7A 12.11.00. PAGE 4 
C 
1I WRIT(3,26)TIHEYYINErROP,VYLTlI),VY('IT(2) 
26 FORHAT(IOXFIO.6.4X,F1 0.4.11W, E1.6, AX,EI 3.6,6X .E1.C) 
175 C 
C0* OUT'UJT FILE FOR PLOT OUTTNL 
WRITE It)T TE,YYIN, ERPOPYYOUT( I),YYOUT(21 
180 IDIT = ICNT 4 i 
IF{ICNT.EO.NPTF)G0 TO 112 
TINE = TIME + PEICO 
C 
195 GALL INPtT(YYINI 
C 
o THIS IS LOOP I CR TIE RIOHT CONTROL SURFACE 
C 
It 
i O C 
C ALL fLOCKI ARE IREATE3 AS PUFfE GAINS 
C EXCFPT FOR THC ACTUATR QLOCW. 
0 
C 
IRS 0 SINE THE INPUT IS SIVEN AS CEGREES THE 
O VALUF IS DIVIDED fl TWO SINCE FOR A +20 DE-
C GREr CCHMAND A +10 40LTS SIG.IAL MUST RE 
C 
C 
APPLIED. 
20D AMFIt(I) = 
AMPOUT(I) A'P(I 
YYIN/2. 
* AMPIN(C) 
EHSVIK(I) = AHPDJT(II - FOGUT(I) 
C 
C THRESH IS THE StI8ROJTINF FOP MODELING A 
205 C nEA.nqAN! JR TH3CSHOLO NONLIIgARITV. TN THE 
C CLO .EO LOOP RESPOSE DEADPA'O GIVES THE 
o HYSTEaR 1IS NO'LTN.ARITY. 
C 
CALL THRFSH(IF.HSVIN) 
210 C 
a THES TWO L1N5'- LINIT THF FHV INPUT CUPRENT 
C 
IF{EH9VI(I().LE.-4.OEHSVI;(T) = -410 
IF(EHSkIt(I).GE.4.OEHSVIN(I) 4.0 
215 C 
EHSOUTII) = EHSV (Il EHSVIN(I) 
ACTINI) =FHSOUT(I) 0 
o 
o ACTUATOc IS MOOrLEO AS A' T-I ,GPATOF 
220 e0 
ACTOUT(IT = ACTIflI * ACTII - CTlI) * PrPIPD / 2.0 
C 
SA.TINr{I) I ACT(I I PCPIOD / 2.0 
C THE VTC LIHIT tUgROUTIHF LTfI'S THE PH 
225 C M)V-MEIT TO P.312 IN./SfC. A SPECIFIED. 
CALC RLIHIT( ,ACTOUTACT1,f'rlCD) 
5 'ROGRAM JXCC 

230 	 C 
C 
C 
235 
C 
240 	 C 

o 

C 

C 

C 
245 	 C
 
C
 
C
 
C 
260 	 C
 
C
 
265 

C 
C 
270 	 C 
C 
C 
275 

C 
C
 
2R§ 

285 
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THE:E TWC LINES ARE THE POSITIOK LIMITS FOO 
THE ACTUATOR. 
IFtACTOUT(I)GE..503)ACTOUT(I) .503
 
IF(ACICUT{h).LE.-.SO)ACTOUTUI-,
 
LVOTIN(I) = ACTOUT(I) 
LVOOUT(Il = LV)T(Il - LVOTIN (1) 
OEVOnI (I) = LVOOJT (I) 
DEMOCC(II)= oS (! - r) (t) 
tHE SUPFACE P3SITION ACCORDING TO THE DENOD-
ULATOR CUTPUT IS GIVEN IN OLCPEES FOR PLOT 
CLAPITY BUT ALSO TO SIMULATE HAT THE ON­
hOARO CCHPUTSR MIZHr 3E SEEIING WITH RESPECT 
TO NOIRE. 
YYOUTIT) = 	IDEMOnOII) * 39.T?)l()E4OD(I) LVOT(I)) 
FEEDIN(I) - DEHOnO(1) 
FCOUT(I) = FEE(I) FEEn(II) 
ACTINP(I) - ACTIN(I)
 
ACTI(I) = ACTOUTEIO
 
I 2' 
AHFIN(I) = YYIN/2. 
AHPOUT(X) = AMP(I) - AMPTNfI) 
EHSVIN(IX = AMPOUT(I) - FDOUT(I) 
CALL TPRESI I,EHSVIN) 
IF(ESVII(I).LE.-4.O)EHSVIN(T -4.0
 
IF(EHSVI?(I)GE.4.OFHSVINII) 4.0
 
EHSOUT(I) = EqSV(I) - qHSVIN (I)
 
ACTIM(I) = FHSOUTIl)
 
ACTHATO'P IS MbDELED AS AN INTEGRATOR 
ACTOUT(I) ACTOUT(I) 4 ACTTNCI) * ACT(I) - PERIOD / 2.0 
ACTINF() * ACT() * PFRIOr / 2.0 
CALL RLIMIT(IACTOUTACTI ,PFPT(P)
 
IF(ACTOIJT(IlGE..50)ACTOUT() = .03 
IF(ACTUT(I).LE.-.50)ACTOIJTI!) -. 503 
LVOTINII) = ACTOUT(!)
 
LVOOUT(II = LVOT(I) - LV.TTN(II
OFODI(II = LVDOIT(!) 
CEMODC(I) = DE'IOD(1) - DEHCI(T) 
YYOUT(I) = 	 (I)FmO111) " 3q.7 )/IDE0(Il * LVOT(I)) 
OROGRAX JXCC 73/74 'CPr-t FTI 4. P#75060 05111/18 12.11.00. PAGE 6 
FEFDIN(II OEHO'o(r) 
FOCUT I = FFE')(EI FEFnItlH 
C 
290 
ACTI(I 
ACTINP(I) . 
= ACTOUT(I) 
ACTIIC(T) 
C 
C THE DTFFFRENCr T4 TIE TWOl M,?NITOR OUTPUTS 
C IS CALrLLATEG A'O 0 I1TC- A "ERPOR.­
-4 
to C 
ERROR = YYCUT(1) - VYOUT(2) 
GO TO tit 
0 
300 C CALL TO PLOT 'OUTINE 
C 
112 CCNTINUE 
REWINC 4 
DO 723 KV = i.NCASES 
U5 CALL SCP;BL(KH) 
723 CONTINUE 
PEIINO 4 
CALL FLO1(0.,Oqq9) 
REWIND 6 
310 STOP 
END 
00 
0 
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SUBROUTINE TPRESH(JVALUFI
 
OIMENSION VALUE(2)

COMHON TIENFTS;THSPEC(IRLSFEC(2 WHYSIEC(21NCASVs
 
5 CSTOPE 	 TFE SIGN
 
IF(VALLE(JI.LT.O.O.! = -$.B
 
IF(VALUF(J).GE.O.O)Z = +t.G
 
DEAD = ABSIVALUE(Jl)
 
C EIGHT 1IA IS THE FUL. STQOF FWING OF THE 
C EHSV INPUT.C 
SPECS 4. 4 THSPEC(J)
 
15 	 C 
C THE OEACPAND IS ADDED OR SUnTFACTEO FROM 
c THE EHSV INPU T. 
C 
IF(DEAD.GE.SPECSIVALUE(JI = VALUE(J) -(Z - SIECq)

20 IF(DEAC.LT.SPECS)VALUE(J) = 0.0
 
RETURN
 
END
 
SUBROUTINE 	RLIMIT, 73/74 OPT=i FIN 4.2*?5060 05111/7f 12.IL. 17. PAGE 
SU8ROUTI E RLIMZItOUT,0UlI,-FR)
 
DIMENSION CUT(22.OUTI(2
 
COMMON TIVE,NF1STHS0EC(2) ,LSFEC(2)

C 
5 	 O BY COMPARING THE SPECIFIED RATE LIMIT OF
 
O 2.312 IN./SEC. TO THE DELTA FOSITION IN ONE
 
C PEqIOO A LAOGER VALUE IS nFC EASEO TO THE
 
C 	 SPECIFIED
 
C 
10 	 SPECS = 2.312 * LSPECtI) 
G0 = (OUT(I) - OJTI(I))/PEP 
ZZ = 1. 
IFtGG.LT.O.O)ZZ = -1.0C 
15 IFI(AES(GG)).GT.SPECS)OUT () = SPECS'ZZ*PE +OUTt(I) 
RETURN 
ENO
 
00 
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SU3ROU1INE INPLT(VALUE) 
C 
C THI3 13 THF SUB0OUTINF FOR 'P1 COMMANO INPUT 
C
 
5CCHHON TIrENPTS
 
C 
to C RANOCH ISE Z7ERO MEAN AND STANDARD DEV! A-
C TION CF 1.0. 
C
 
.IF(HPTS.LT.400V&LUE GPANO(0) 
C 
I5 IFNOPTS.EO.4laTGO TO 2 
C 
GO TO 3
 
C 
C SINE hAVE OF 5.0 DESREES , 5,0 HZ.
 
-20 C
 
2 THETA = TIME * 6.213S1 * .2q
 
VALUE = SIN(TPETA) 1 .06'
 
tGO CONTINUE
 
25 RETURN
 
END
 
03 
4.?75060 12.1t.11.
SUBROUTINE ANOISE 73/74 OPT= . F N 0/11i7R PAGE 
SUBROUTINE ANOISE(OP,N,(,MbH)
 
PEAL MX
 
DIMENSION BP(2)aVALU(2l
 
COMMCN TIHE,NFTSTHSPEC(2),RLSFE,(t2 HYS'ES(2),HCASFC
 
C 
c GRAHO I A WHITE NOISE GENEFATO CF ZERO 
G HEAH A LNITY STANOARD DEVIATION 
C 
VALUE(N$=GRANn(ID
 
io 0
 
£ THE NCISE LEVEL IS ;IVEN AS A PERCENT OF
 
C MAXIHU SIGNAL LEqE. AT THE PCINT OF INTER­
o EST. THIS MUST RE PROVIDED fY THE USER.
 
C
 
15 BP(N) = VALUE(N) .001 MX + RP(NI
 
RETURN
 
END
 
o 
'C 
,j.
 
FUNCTION GRAND 73/74 OPT=i FTN 4.274060 
C 
FUNCTION GRAND(N 
C.... WRITTEN 0/22/75 A MYERS. NASA/FRC
G.... ADAPTED BY J OROWNLOW FROM 
5 C 
C COMM OF<THE ACM ALGOQITFM 48R 
C 0ECtPR.R 1'974 
C -VOL i7 NO. 12 
C -cA(E 704 
la C -, 
C ROUTINE'REIURNS -SEUIO RANDOM NUMBER WITH 
C A GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION WI'H ZERO MEAN A 
C STANOARD DEVIATION OF UNITY 
C 
i5 C NOTE: USES RANF TO SUPPLY UNIFORM PSEUDO 
C RANOCH NUMBER WITH 1NIFOFH DISTRIBUTION 
C OVER THE RANGE 0 TO 1.0 
C 
20 
C 
C 
NOTE: REQUIRES ONE INITIALIZAT104 CALL 
C NOTE: N IS A OUNIY ARGUMENT 
o 
DIMENSION C(491 
co 
.:6 25 COMMON /GRANDS/ U DATA.D, *E74489750, .475RA5630, .383771164, .32q61t323, 
'.2912127 
Ei1634166, 
.263644!22, .?42508452, .225667444,
19q2426?, .1A99t0758, *iAt2?sis8, 
* .173601400, .j6f4jqfl0 .160707??, *15E34qf17, 
.t504q384, .14590277, .14t770033, .137963174, 
30 .134441762, .131172150, .128125q65, .125279090, 
.122610583. 1201O%, .1177470?, 11-51j1t9Z
113402349, .i1402720, 109503R52, .10 76B7617, 
*i05976772, .104334941, LO2766012, .101269052,
*C99827234, Oqi448282, .097124309, .095S177t, 
35 .094627461, .093448407, ,0923i19Q, .091215482, 
A=O,0 
.090155838, *089133t67, .088144619, .087187293/ 
I = 0 
I CONTINUE 
40 U=U+U 
IF(U.LT. i.9)GO TO 2 
U=0-10 
1=1 U 
45 
A=A-D(I) 
GO TO I 
2 CCNTINUE 
W=D(I+)#U 
V=W (0.5H-A) 
3 CONTINUE 
50 U=PAtF(O) 
IF(V.LE.U)6O TO 4 
V:RANF(0) 
55 
IF(IJ.GT.V)GO TO 3 
U=(V-U/(t.0-U) 
GO TO 2 
4 CONTINUE 
U=(Ui-Vl/ (I*-V) 
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GRAND 
GRAI'
 
S ANO
 
r'
GRAND
 
GRAND
 
GRAND
 
GRAND
 
GRANO 
GRA O
 
GRAND
 
GRA
 
GPAND
 
GRANO
 
GRAND
 
GRAND 
GRAND
 
CR AND 
GRAND
 
GRANO 
GRAM) 
GRANO 
GRAND 
GRAND 
GRAND 
GRAND 
GRAND 
GRAND
 
GRAND
 
GRANO
 
GRA C
 
GRAND
 
GRAND
 
GRAtD
 
GPAND
 
GRANO
 
GRANO
 
GRA,0
 
GRAND
 
GRAND
 
GRAND
 
GRAND
 
GRAhC
 
GRAMO
 
GRAND
 
GRAND
 
GRAND
 
GRAND
 
GPAND 
GRANO
 
GRAND
 
GRANO
 
GRAND
 
GRAbO
 
GRANO
 
GRAND
 
GRAND
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FJNCTION GRAND 73/7' OPT=I F'N 4.?*75060 05/Ii/71 12.ti.30. PAGE 2 
U=U*U GRAND 
60 
IF(U.LT. I.O)GO T3 
U:U-t.O 
G AN= $-A 
RETURN 
5 CONTINUE 
GRANO=A-
5 GRAND 
GRANn 
GPAhg 
GRANO 
GRAND 
GR AND 
65 END 
03 
00 
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SUADt )UTIkF CPIBL(K) 
CCHIOI TIFENFTSTHSDECC?) ,L rE. (?),HYSPEZ(2) ,NCA F 
REAL DUF 2049),TtiflnOO) tDATA(1000 1,YI1OOl ),LPIf(IOL) ,LP2(ti000 
5 C 
DIMENSION NITLE(),STORE(5(i,S IRO)3S(600), SSS60r,)TT(600) 
CALL PLOTS (BLF20 % 6) 
CALL FACTOF(2.0/?.54) 
CALL PLOT(2.,2..r31 
DATA N7ITLE/lHTIME HISTOIOHY,FrC ,IOH CAFE NCiOH 
C 
C THIS rIJEFCUTINE P-OTS THE COMMAND INPUT, 
C THE LEFT AND RIGHT SURFACP HCVFMENTS AND 
C THE ERROQ BETWEEN TiE TWO VtPSUS TIME. 
ENCOOE(i0,i,NIILE(4))K 
I FOPliAT(2X,12,6X" 
C 
C SET VARIABLES FOR ILLUSTRATING THE SAMPLED 
*20 C 
C 
DATA EFFECT 
Cl II I 
5(rJ) = 0. 
25 SS(IJ) = 0. 
SSSlIJI = 0. 
TT(IJ) = 0. 
00 777 J = 1,NPTS 
30 C 
REAO(4)T(J),Y(J).DDATA(JIhLPI(J)hLP2(J) 
C A SAMPLE AROUND THE A-PROFRIATE SAMPLE TINE 
C IS TAKrN AND HELD TILL THE NEXT SAMPLE TINE 
C 
IFCT(J),LT.((i./53.3)I))GO TO 777 
35 II= 11*1 
IJ - IJ f 2 
S(IJ) DDATAIJ) 
S(IJ-I) = S(iJ-21 
SS(IJ) LFI(J) 
40 SS(1J-1) SS(IJ-2) 
SSS(IJ) LP2(J 
SSS(IJ-k) 5SS(IJ-2) 
TT(IJ) = T(J) 
TT(IJ-I) = T(J-t) 
45 777 CONTINUE 
C 
C THE DATA IS SCALED. SINCE A SCALE FACTOR OF 
C EIGHT IS UN3ESICAILE IF IT ?ICULC APPEAR 
C THE EIGHT SUBROUTINE CHANGFS THE SCALE 
50 C FACTCP 10 TEN. 
C 
CALL SCALE(DDATA,2.flNPTSi) 
CALL EIGT(DODATANPTS) 
CALL SCALE(T.7.0.NPTSI) 
55 CALL EIGIT(TNFT3) 
CALL SCALE(Y,2. ,NPTS.1) 
CALL EIGHT(Y,NPTSI) 
SUBROUTINE SCRIRL 73/74 OPT2l Frr '.? 7506C 05/I11/?1 2.11,20. PAGE 2 
60 
C 
CALL SCALE(L01,2.0,NPTS,1) 
CALL SCALE(LP2,2.0,N0TS,1) 
CALL EIGHTLP2,NPTS) 
65 
C 
C 
C 
C 
THE SCALE FACTO;S AID STARTING VALUES FOR 
THE SAMPLED POINTS ARE TPANFE&RED TO THE 
RESPECTIVE ARRAYS. 
70 
75 
C 
C 
TT(IJ#I) = T(UPTS1) 
TT(I)42) = T(NPTS42 
S(IJ+l) = CDATA(IPT4I) 
SIJ#22 = CDATA('NPTS2) 
SS(IJ+i) = LP±(N'TS41) 
SSIJ2) = LPI(NPTS+2) 
SSS(IJ+I) = LPPPIPTS*I) 
SSS(IJ+2) 2 LP2(NPTS+2) 
TIME AXIS 
00 
1385 
80 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
CALL AXIS (O.,O.,NITLE,-40,7.0,0.,T(NPTS*LitT(NPTZ2) 
CALL PLOT(O..7.5-3 
ERROR AXIS 
CALL AX9o (O.,0.,-ER0OPDEG "+12, 2.,9.,OCATA(IPS),OATA(NP 
*TSI2) I 
ERROP PLOT 
't 
0 
go 
C 
c 
CALL LINE(T,DOATANPTSiflO) 
CALL LINETTSIJ,i.0.O) 
CALL PLOT (O.,-2.5,-3) 
COMMAND 
SAMPLE RATE EFFFCT 
AXIS 
95 C 
CALL AX9O (0.,0v"COMANO.DEG 
COFMANlO 
"013..3,90.,Y(NPTS+JlY(NPTSf2II 
PLOT 
CALL LINE (T,'Y,4PTSt,0,0) 
CALL PLOT(O,-2., -3) 
* iOC 
C 
RIGHT SURFACE AXIS 
105 
C 
C 
CALL AX9O(O.,O.,'RTDOEG",46,2.CqO.0LPI[(PrS*1),LPI(NPTS2) 
RIGHT SLRFACE PLOT 
110 
C 
C 
C 
CALL LINE(TLPi,'4PTSIflD 
CALL LINE(TT,SStIJ,1,0,0 
CALL PLOTO .,-2.5,-3) 
LE-FT 
SAMPLE RATE EFFCT 
FIIFFACE AXIS 
C 
CALL AXqO t0.,v0.,"L.TDEG", +6, 2. 0,0 ,L"2(4PTS4i1) ,LP21('JPTS*2) 
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11.5 	 C L'tSIlFGF -LOT 
*C
 
CALL LWNE ITL]P2,'IPTS t .D,0)
 
C CALL LINFIITSSSIJ, ,oO) S8HPLF RATE EFFECT
 
CALL SCA LE(DOATA.2.0,NTSI0
 
120 	 C 
C COOF TO ARRANSE SCALE FACTO;,S FOR A CUHULA-
C TIVE FLCT Or THE ERROR DATA Of ALL CASES
 
STORE0 = DOVATAINPT+1c. 
125 CALL SCAE(DDAIA,2.0,NPTS,'I) 
STOREF2) =DDArA(NPTSCi)
 
IF(K, E.NCASES)GO 10 5
 
CALL SCA IE (STORE,9.5 NCASES2, 1)

CALL EIr-FT(STORE,(NCASES'2))
 
130 	 ODATA .PTS4I) = STOR5(NCASCS-2*2) 
ODATA(NPIS#2) = STORF(NCASFSV'2) 
CALL PLOT(1 .,O.,-3)

CALL AXqOIO.,0.,'SECONS",-7,7.,. ,INPTSL).T (NPTS 2) )

CALL tXqflC.,O.,"ERRlR OUTPUT ALL CASES,DES,+26,oq.5,90.,DDATA(NP
 
135 	 TS+1) 0nOATA (NPTS 2)) 
REWINC 4 
00 	 ALL CASES PLOT 
L40 DO 7 L = INCASES 
D0 6 N = tNPTS 
READ()T (N),Y(N) ODATA(N LPI(tl.LP2(N) 
6 CONTINUE 
CALL LIIM4ElDDATANPTS ,0) 
14s 7 CbHTINUE 
S CALL FLO1(12,-2,-30 
RETURN
 
END
 
SUBROUTINE EIGHT 
10 
C 
C 
C 
o 
c 
C 
15 
C 
C 
OENO 
to 
20 
0 
-I 
73/74 OPT~i FTHJ 4.2O75060 05i/Ie 12.tt.ZR. PAGE t
 
SUOROUTIKE SIGPT(QATNPT;)
 
DIHENSION CAT(io00)
 
THE SCALE FACTOR OF OAT ARPAY DIMENSIONED 
NPTS COINTS I CHEC(E3 TO SEE IF IT IS A 
FACTCP OF EIGHT(NIGHT BE 8 ,0, OR 800 ETC.)
THEN CHANGE IT TO 10, M00, .1 , ETC. 
Z= 1.
 
IF(OTUfPTS 2).LT.O.)Z=-l.
 
o = 4LOGIO(AlSfDAT(NPTS42))I

£ = ALOGiO(8. 
CC = 0-INT(0) 
IF(A9S(CC-E).GT..0Ot.AND.Ai$S(rC-(E-I.)).GT..011 RTURN 
IF(CC.LT.O.)O= INT(f)+0.
 
IF(CC.GT.0,)O= IrT(O)+t.
 
DAT(NPTS42) =(iO )! 
RETURN
 
CONVERSION FACTORS TO SI UNITS
 
To correct from- To- Multiply by 
psi N/m2 6894.76 
in m 0.0254 
in 2 1550.15 
Vac/in Vac/m 39.37 
deg/in deg/m 39.37 
in3/sec-mA m3/sec-mA 1.639xi0- 5 
in/sec m/sec 0.0254 
90
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